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The paper reported two correlational studies. The aim of the Study 1 was to examine the hypothesis that age moderates 
the relationship between need for closure (NFC) and cognitive structuring. Results of the study revealed that aging with 
increased need for closure was associated with better recognition of irrelevant information than schema-relevant items, in 
testing hypotheses about the target person. These findings are interpreted as demonstrating the age-associated failure of 
cognitive abilities (i.e., low efficacy at fulfilling the need for closure), reducing tendency to behave according to the level 
of epistemic motivation. The results of Study 2 demonstrated that older participants are characterized by higher NFC but 
by lower EFNC than young participants. These results are consistent with the conclusion that the negative relationships 
between NFC and cognitive structuring demonstrated by the older participants in Study 1 can be attributed to their lower 
level of EFNC. 
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Age-related changes in cognitive structuring
Much research has indicated that aging is accompanied 
by decrements in information processing across a wide 
variety of tasks and situations. One of the domains in 
which age-related changes in performance are observed is 
cognitive structuring (e.g., Castel & Craik, 2003; Naveh-
Bejamin, 2000; Hess, 2005; Klaczynski & Robinson, 
2000). Researchers have claimed that cognitive structuring 
plays a significant role in diverse phenomena such as person 
perception and memory processes (e.g., Hastie et al., 1980; 
Lorenzi-Cioldi, Eagly, & Stewart, 1995; Moskowitz, 1993), 
stereotyping (e.g., Kruglanski & Freund, 1983; Bar-Tal 
& Guinote, 2002; Schaller et al., 1995), cognitive biases 
(Kruglanski & Ajzen, 1983), uncertainty (e.g., Bunder, 
1962; Mayseles & Kruglanski, 1987; McCormick, 2002), 
stress and coping (Epstein & Meier, 1989; Wheaton, 1983; 
Clark, 1993; Bar-Tal & Spitzer, 1999; Elovainio & Kivimaki, 
1999), and attitude behavior relationships (Jamieson & 
Zanna, 1989; Baldwin, 1992; Murray & Holmes, 1999). 
Cognitive structuring is defined as the “creation and use of 
abstract mental representations (e.g., schemata prototypes, 
scripts, attitudes, and stereotypes) — representations that 
are simplified generalizations of previous experience” 
(Neuberg & Newsom, 1993; p. 113). 
It has been suggested that using such structures is 
a means of understanding one’s world with a relatively 
minimal expenditure of cognitive resources, by specific 
attendance to schema-relevant information and avoidance 
of schema-irrelevant information. Because they are simple, 
relatively effortless, and automatic, such structures are 
best able to reduce an individual’s cognitive load. Thus, 
such reliance on cognitive structuring may increase with 
age (Hess, 2001; Klaczynski & Robinson, 2000; Cornelis, 
Van Hiel, Roets, & Kossowska, 2009; Levy, 2008). Older 
individuals, having less cognitive capacity than younger 
adults, may tend to use more cognitive structuring, which 
is an easy default option (Bohner, Moskowitz, & Chaiken, 
1995; Fiske, 1993a) and less taxing on their resources 
(Keinan et al., 1991). Thus there is an inherent assumption 
that cognitive structuring replaces more effortful processing 
among older adults by virtue of its being the easiest default 
option that is always available to people who need it 
(Klaczynski & Robinson, 2000). 
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Cognitive structuring and epistemic motivation
Apart from this line of reasoning pointing to reduced 
cognitive capacity, however, there is evidence suggesting 
that the explanation of the age-cognitive structuring 
relationship may be connected with motivational changes 
associated with age. Epistemic motivation—specifically, 
need for closure—is the most widely employed explanation 
for the use of cognitive structuring (Kruglanski, 1989). 
However, need for closure has not received enough 
attention in the explanation of the effect of aging on the 
various phenomena connected with cognitive structuring. 
Need for closure is defined as a need to have any answer 
on a given topic, as opposed to further ambiguity (Webster 
& Kruglanski, 1994). As such, it has been described as the 
tendency to reduce the feeling of discomfort experienced in 
the face of cognitive uncertainty through quick formulation 
of a hypothesis and its short validation (Webster & 
Kruglanski, 1994). It is well documented that the cognitive 
processes used by high need for closure individuals to 
reduce uncertainty are category-based, nonsystematic, 
and heuristic (Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Pavelchak, 1986). 
In contrast, individuals with low levels of need for 
closure prefer to reduce uncertainty by using piecemeal 
or individuation processes. This preference is manifested 
in vigilant behavior that is based on a systematic and 
effortful search for relevant information, its evaluation, 
and its unbiased assimilation (Kruglanski et al., 2009; 
Bar-Tal et al., 1997; Driscoll, Hamilton, & Sorrentino, 
1991). Thus, it is important to note that need for closure is 
often—though not always explicitly—conceptualized as a 
dimension that at its high pole predisposes individuals to 
use cognitive structuring to achieve certainty, and at its low 
pole is associated not with indifference or low motivation 
to achieve certainty but with a strong tendency toward 
piecemeal processes. 
It could be expected that this motivation, manifested 
as a tendency to preserve available resources and engage 
in activities that minimize drain on these resources 
(Kossowska, 2007; Kossowska, Orehek, & Kruglanski, 
2010), may play a crucial role in how information is 
processed in older versus younger age. Older adults 
might conserve resources by simplifying their interactions 
with the environment and limiting both the quantity and 
complexity of information to which they attend. This 
may be manifested as a reliance on highly routinized and 
schematic behavioral patterns rather than constructing new, 
and perhaps more adaptive, ones on the spot (Hess, 2001). 
Need for closure and efficacy at fulfilling this need
The notion that high need for closure predisposes people 
to use more simplified and effortless processing implies that 
cognitive structuring is an automatic, easy, default option 
(Fiske, 1993a), so that whenever individuals are motivated 
to achieve closure they indeed use the epistemic behavior 
consistent with their motivation. If this is the case, high need 
for closure is always manifested in the application of prior 
knowledge structure (i.e., expectations, opinions, schemata, 
or stereotypes) and the processing of information related to 
the schema. By contrast, individuals motivated to postpone 
closure will actually use their preferred processing mode 
only inasmuch as they have sufficient resources or ability 
to do so (e.g., Ford & Kruglanski, 1995; Pelham & Neter, 
1995). 
However, there are several lines of research suggesting 
that it might not always be the case. Cognitive closure 
is defined as a goal (Kruglanski et al., 2002) and there 
are premises in the literature that suggest that specific 
conditions might be needed to enable fulfilling this goal. 
For example, Bar-Tal and his colleagues (Bar-Tal, Kishon-
Rabin, & Tabak, 1997; Bar-Tal & Guinote, 2002; Bar-Tal & 
Kossowska, 2010), have suggested that like in the case of 
fulfilling low need for closure, fulfilling high need for closure 
also depends on the individual’s actual or perceived ability 
to act upon his/her epistemic motivation. That is, satisfying 
the need for closure, like satisfying the need to postpone 
closure, requires certain perceived or actual ability. We call 
this the efficacy to fulfill the need for closure and define it 
as the extent to which individuals perceive themselves as 
able to use cognitive structuring in accordance with their 
need for closure (Bar-Tal & Kossowska, 2010). Previous 
studies of Bar-Tal and colleagues revealed that there is 
an interaction effect between the need for closure (NFC) 
and efficacy at fulfilling this need (EFNC; Bar-Tal, et al., 
1997; Bar-Tal & Guinote, 2002; Bar-Tal & Kossowska, 
2010; Otten & Bar-Tal, 2002; Kossowska & Bar-Tal, 
submitted). Thus, while high EFNC individuals exhibit 
epistemic behavior consistent with their level of NFC, low 
EFNC individuals’ epistemic behavior oppositely relate to 
their level of NFC: The higher their NFC the less they use 
cognitive structuring.  
It has been suggested that aging may be accompanied 
by decreased self-efficacy (Blazer, 2002; Welch & West, 
1995). Negative self-efficacy beliefs are possible due to 
changes—both actual and perceived—in factors associated 
with health, cognitive ability, and social status. These 
perceptions may be generalized to other domains, such as 
efficacy at fulfilling the need for closure. Thus, it is possible 
that aging may moderate the effect of need for closure on 
cognitive structuring behavior. This hypothesis is consistent 
with research findings that demonstrate that self-efficacy 
judgments may act as a moderating agent between changes 
in specific contextual and personal factors associated with 
ageing (e.g., need for closure) and engagement in specific 
behaviors or activities as individuals adjust their behavior to 
be consistent with their current status ( see also Heckhausen 
& Baltes, 1991; Hertzog, McGuire, & Lineweaver, 1998; 
Hultsch et al., 1987; Lachman, 1986; Lachman, Bandura, 
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Weaver, & Elliott, 1995; Lachman & McArthur, 1986). 
Second important limitation on fulfilling the cognitive 
goal comes from the cognitive abilities possessed by 
an individual. Specifically, studies on self-regulation 
demonstrated that it was significantly influenced by working 
memory capacity. For example, Hoffman and colleagues 
(2008) shown that automatic tendencies had a stronger 
impact on self-regulatory behavior among individuals with 
a low WMC than in individuals with a high WMC.  This 
pattern of results was also demonstrated with regard to the 
need for cognitive closure (Kossowska & Jasko, in press) 
such that individuals with high WMC were more able to 
act in line with their epistemic motivation than people 
with low WMC. Since working memory capacity is lower 
among older adults it might reduce their ability to act in 
accordance with their cognitive goals. 
On the basis of those results it could be argued that the 
relation between epistemic goals such as NFC and cognitive 
functioning may not be that straightforward among older 
adults. The aim of the present study was to verify whether 
older adults would behave consistently with the level of 
their epistemic motivation or due to above-mentioned 
factors  instead of using more cognitive structuring (e.g., 
processing more schema-relevant information) they may in 
fact use less cognitive structuring (e.g., processing irrelevant 
items) the higher their need for closure in comparison to 
younger adults. 
Overview of the study 
In the studies we investigated the processing of 
schema-relevant and schema-irrelevant information in 
an impression formation task. Many investigators over 
the years have used types of schema-related information 
as dependent variables in researching the structure and 
process of information organization (for reviews, see Alba 
& Hasher, 1983; Brewer, 1988; Fiske, 1993a; Dijksterhuis, 
van Knippenberg, Kruglanski, & Schaper, 1996). It has 
been shown that recall as well as recognition of schema-
relevant information changes as a function of epistemic 
motivation (Bar-Tal & Kossowska, 2010). 
Although many studies demonstrated that older 
adults had less memory for schema-irrelevant items and 
more false alarms for non-presented schema-relevant 
items (Chen, 2004; Hess & Tate, 1991; Hess, Donley, & 
Vandermaas,1989), there was no data in the literature on 
the relation between the epistemic motivation and cognitive 
structuring in this age group. We suspected that the specific 
pattern of this relation could be different among older adults 
than the one usually obtained with younger samples of 
participants. Due to lower efficacy to fulfill epistemic need, 
low WMC and other factors that decrease the self-regulatory 
behavior among older adults they could in fact present less 
cognitive structuring and less schematic processing when 
high in need for closure than younger adults (Isbell, 2004). 




Two group of participants were included in Study 1. The 
group of young adults consisted of 98 participants (Mage = 
22.16; age range: 21-23 years), who were students from 
the university in Krakow. The older adults were thirty five 
women and twenty men (Mage = 72.18; age range: 65-80 
years) (see Table 1, for demographics and test scores). 
Older participants were included in the sample on condition 
that they were at least high school graduates, had no major 
health problems, and had a total of more than 25 points 
out of 30 in the Mini Mental State Examination (MMSE, 
Folstein, Folstein & McHugh, 1975). They were given a 
small incentive for their participation in the study. 
  Younger group Older group
M SD M SD
STUDY 1
RSPAN 32.1 a 6.8 19.1 b 5.7
NFC 3.07 a .71 3.75 b .52
A` .90 a .09 .82 b .13
B” .27 .43 .01 .45
Recognition of relevant items 7.97 a 1.90 7.28 a 2.53
Recognition of irrelevant items 4.27 a 1.24 3.44 b 1.63
a and b differ significantly p < .001
Positive B” scores indicate a tendency toward committing more omissions of relevant items while negative scores indicate more liberal bias with a 
tendency toward a more false alarms of relevant items. Thus, more positive B”, the less schematic information processing. A’ indicates the level of 
discrimination between target stimuli and new items during recognition with higher A’ scores indicating higher discrimination. 
NFC – need for closure; RSPAN – working memory measure
Table 1
Descriptive statistics (Study 1).
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Material and Procedures
We used four of the five subscales of the 32 items Polish 
version (Kossowska, 2003) of Webster & Kruglanski’s 
scale (1994): Preference for order and structure in the 
environment, Predictability of future contexts, Affective 
discomfort occasioned by ambiguity, and Closed-
mindedness. We excluded one subscale, Decisiveness, 
because it has been recognized as tapping ability to achieve 
cognitive closure but not motivation (Roets & Van Hiel, 
2007). Respondents rated 27 items on a six-point scale 
(from 1 = completely disagree, to 6 = completely agree). 
The mean score of all items was calculated (Cronbach α = 
0.84). The higher the mean score, the higher the need for 
closure (NFC).
To test whether cognitive abilities are responsible 
for age-related changes in cognitive structuring, we 
administered the short version of the RSPAN working 
memory test prepared by Daneman & Carpenter (1980) 
(Polish version by Dąbrowska, 2009). We decided to test 
working memory, i.e., the ability to preserve information 
in a temporary short-term store while processing is carried 
out, as it has been postulated as the important source of age 
differences in various aspects of cognition (Verhaeghen & 
Salthouse, 1997). 
Participants were presented with ten series of short 
unconnected sentences. The number of sentences in a set 
was incrementally increased from 3 at the beginning to 
7 in the final set. The tasks were to evaluate whether the 
sentence read by the experimenter was true or false and 
to memorize the last word of each sentence. After each 
set was read, participants wrote down all the remembered 
words. The number of correctly recalled words served as 
index of working memory span.
To measure the way in which information is processed we 
carried out a task previously tested and validated in studies 
by Bar-Tal and Kossowska (2010). Respondents were 
asked to imagine that they have just met a friendly person. 
The aim of this instruction was to create a hypothesis about 
the target person. Then they were given 15 information 
segments regarding the target person’s behavior. Participants 
were asked to imagine that they wanted to verify whether 
their first impression (that the person is friendly) was 
correct by examining the list of behaviors. They were to 
rate on 5-points scale in what extent the certain behavior 
was consistent with the behaviors of the friendly person. 
The list consisted of five prototypical items, i.e., items 
consistent with the impression, five diagnostic items, i.e., 
items inconsistent with the impression, and five items 
irrelevant to the impression. For instance, a prototypical 
item was ‘Volunteered to care for lonely older people’, 
an inconsistent item was ‘Refused to talk with fellow 
passengers on an organized trip’, and an irrelevant item 
was ‘Reads Gazeta Wyborcza’ (a Polish daily newspaper). 
Performance of this task was expected to activate the 
schema of the friendly person. Then participants completed 
a filler task. Next they were given the list of 30 behaviors, 
from which they were ask to choose those behaviors 
that had appeared in the original list. The list consisted 
of 15 previously seen stimuli and 15 new descriptions. 
We calculated number of schema-relevant (consistent 
and inconsistent) and irrelevant information recognized 
correctly. Additionally, results of the recognition test were 
analyzed using the signal detection approach (Donaldson, 
1992; Radvansky, Curiel, Zwaan, & Copeland, 2001). 
Correct recognitions for schema-relevant information were 
counted as hits and incorrect recognitions for schema-
relevant items were considered false alarms. Two statistics 
were computed. A’ indicates the level of discrimination 
between target stimuli and new items during recognition 
with higher A’ scores indicating higher discrimination. 
B” is a measure of recognition bias. Positive B” scores 
indicate a conservative tendency toward committing more 




Age group -.70*** .60*** -.35*** -.28***      -.15 -.27**
RSPAN -.42***
(-.06)
























Partial correlation with control for age are presented in brackets
* p<.05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001
Positive B” scores indicate a tendency toward committing more omissions of relevant items while negative scores indicate more liberal bias with a 
tendency toward a more false alarms of relevant items. Thus, more positive B”, the less cognitive structuring. A’ indicates the level of discrimination 
between target stimuli and new items during recognition with higher A’ scores indicating higher discrimination. 
NFC – need for closure; RSPAN – working memory measure
Table 2
Correlation matrix (Study 1).
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omissions of relevant items while negative scores indicate 
more liberal bias with a tendency toward more false alarms 
of relevant items. Thus, more positive B” indicates less 
schematic information processing.
Participants in the group of younger adults completed 
the questionnaire during group sessions. Older adults were 
contacted individually. We assumed that the individual 
sessions would be less stressful and more comfortable 
for older participant. Participants were told that the aim 
of the study was to explore how people assessed others’ 
personalities. At the end they were debriefed. 
Results
Older adults presented higher NFC than younger adults; 
F(1,151) = 82.77; p < .001; η2 = .36. They remembered fewer 
words in the RSPAN task; F(1,144) = 130.96; p < .001; η2 = 
.48. They recognized fewer irrelevant items from the list; 
F(1,151) = 12.12; p = .001; η2 = .075 in comparison to the 
younger group. They discriminated less between previously 
seen stimuli and new ones as indicated by lower A’ scores; 
F(1,151) = 21.24; p < .001; η2 = .12. They were less inclined to 
make omission mistakes with lower B” scores for relevant 
items than younger participants; F(1,152) = 12.26; p < .001; 
η2 = .076 (see: Table 1 for test scores and Table 2 for the 
correlation matrix).
To test whether NFC influenced cognitive structuring 
differently in groups of older and younger adults, three 
hierarchical regression analyses were performed. Two 
independent variables (NFC and age dummy, coded 
-0.5 young adults / 0.5 older adults) were entered in the 
first step and the effect of the interaction between the 
two variables was assessed in the second step. NFC was 
centered before the cross-products were computed (Dunlap 
& Kemery, 1987). The RSPAN1 was included as a covariate 
variable in both analyses. In addition, the recognition of 
irrelevant items was included as a covariate variable when 
the recognition of schema relevant information score was 
used as dependent variable in order to control for a general 
performance in the recognition task. 
Table 3 shows that the interaction terms turned out to 
be significant for the recognition of relevant items (adj. 
R2=.49, β=-.19, t=2.89, p=.01) and B” (adj. R2=.11, β=.27, 
t=2.86, p=.005). To interpret the source of the interactions, 
the regression lines for NFC on the recognition of relevant 
items (and then B” scores for relevant items) were 
calculated separately for older and younger adults. The 
results of a simple slope analysis indicated that the relation 
between NFC and the recognition of relevant items for older 
participants was significant and negative (unstandardised 
b = -.067; t = 2.98; p = .003), but it was non-significant 
for younger participants (b = .009; t = 0.66; p = .513). 
Similarly, the results of a simple slope analysis indicated 
that the relation between NFC and B” for relevant items for 
1    We tested also alternative hypothesis that RSPAN x age interaction 
influences cognitive structuring, however we did not find any significant 
results. Moreover, we tested moderational mediation model of NFC x age 
mediated by RSPAN – but again we did not find any significant results. 
If we find significant moderational mediation model significant it means 
that working memory capacity is responsible for inconsistency in need for 
closure behavior. In the light of the results we however had to drop this 
explanation.  




t Sig. Adj. R2
B Std. Error Beta
Schema-Relevancy Index .49
(Constant) .698 .033 20.02 .00
RSPAN .000 .001 -.03      .22 .83
Recognition of irrelevant items -.047 .004 -.71 11.63 .00
NFC -.001 .001 -.15   1.32 .19
       Age  .057 .02   .29   2.33 .02
NFC x Age -.004   .002 -.23   2.36 .02
B”relevant .11
(Constant) .041 .051 .816 .416
RSPAN .006 .006 .117 1.039 .301
NFC .009 .004 .249 2.274 .025
Age -.372 .118 -.381 -3.148 .002
NFC x Age .022 .008 .271 2.864 .005
Positive B” scores indicate a tendency toward committing more omissions of relevant items while negative scores indicate more liberal bias with a 
tendency toward a more false alarms of relevant items. Thus, more positive B”, the less cognitive structuring 
NFC – need for closure; RSPAN – working memory measure
Table 3
Regression coefficients (Study 1).
45 Małgorzata Kossowska, Katarzyna Jaśko, Yoram Bar-Tal
older participants was significant and positive (b = .02; t = 
3.38; p = .000) whereas it was non-significant for younger 
participants (b = -.002; t = 0.51; p = .61). The interaction 
lines are presented in Figures 1 and 2.
Regression analysis conducted on the A’  revealed that 
only the group variable was a significant predictor with 
older adults scoring lower on this measure than younger 
adults (adj. R2=.09, β=-.31, t=2.59, p=.01). Neither NFC 
(β=-.05, t=.51, p=.61) nor RSPAN (β=-.00, t=.03, p=.98) 
were significant predictors of A’.
Discussion
In Study 1 we we explored the relation between NFC 
and use of schematic information processing. The results 
of this study confirmed our hypothesis: Increased NFC 
after controlling for the level of memory for irrelevant 
stimuli was related to less memory for relevant stimuli 
among older, but not younger adults. In addition, NFC 
of older adults was positively related to their tendency 
to omit schema-relevant information as indicated by B” 
measure. Lack of effect of NFC on A’ scores shows that 
discrimination between previously seen and new stimuli 
was not affected by NFC. Main effect of age indicates that 
ability to discriminate stimuli decreases with age but this 
relation is not dependent on epistemic needs. We did not 
expected to be the case though. It is not the general accuracy 
that is affected by the NFC but the tendency to use more 
schematic information and therefore should be reflected in 
the type of mistakes as reflected by B” measures. Obtained 
results could be interpreted as pointing at the tendency 
of older adults to use less cognitive structuring with the 
increase of their NFC.
It should be noticed that the results were obtained when 
controlling for cognitive ability, which means that the way 
people process information cannot be sufficiently explained 
by cognitive resources that decreases with age. The effects 
of the study cannot be also sufficiently explained by mere 
NFC. It seems that the strategy of information processing 
depends on NFC but there are also other factors that have 
an impact on it. One of those factors could be self-efficacy 
to fulfill epistemic needs. This possibility should be farther 
explored in future research. While the effect of NFC on 
cognitive structuring in older group is consistent with the 
study hypothesis, the pattern obtained in the younger group 
requires an explanation. It is possible that the combine 
effect of both younger age as well as an easy memory 
task produced ceiling effect which was associated with no 
difference in responding to the needs implied by the level 
of NFC. 
Study 2
Study 1 demonstrated that older participants’ 
epistemic behavior is negatively related to their NFC. This 
phenomenon could be explained by the assumed lower level 
of EFNC characterizes older people. According to Bar-Tal 
and Kossowska (2010), although the results of Study 1 are 
consistent with this assumption, and there is no reasonable 
alternative theoretical explanation, it is still important to 
examine the validity of this assumption. Study 2, therefore, 
examines the effect of age on participants’ level of NFC 
and EFNC. It is hypothesize that while older age group is 
characterized by higher NFC than the younger one, The 
latter group has higher EFNC score than the former.
As a part of a larger study on inluences of need for 
closure on epistemic behavior among older and younger 
adults  we measured levels of NFC and EFNC in groups of 
younger and older adults. Therefore we could compare the 
impact of age on both NFC and EFNC. According to the 
interpretation of results obtained in the Study 1 we should 
find higher NFC but lower EFNC among older adults.
Method
Participants
Participants represented two age groups who were 
recruited through community ads and paid them $10 
(30 PLN). The first consisted of 129 students from the 
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university in Krakow (54 woman and 75 man; Mage = 21.72, 
age ranged from 19 to 26). The second group consisted of 
98 older adults (49 woman and 49 man;  Mage = 67.76, age 
ranged from 60 to 72). Older participants were included in 
the sample on condition that they were at least high school 
graduates, had no major health problems, and had a total of 
more than 25 points out of 30 in the MMSE.
Material and Procedures
To measure NFC we used the same scale as in Study 1 
(Cronbach’s α = .87, M = 3.54). To measure the Efficacy to 
Fulfill Need for Closure (EFNC) we administered the scale 
constructed and validated by Bar-Tal & Kossowska (2010). 
This scale consists of nine items rated on a six-point scale 
(from 1 = completely disagree, to 6 = completely agree). All 
items represent efficacy (rather than epistemic motivation 
such as preferences or wishes) and epistemic behavior 
corresponding to the need for closure. An example of an 
item demonstrating high efficacy is: “I do not bother with 
simple matters, I usually know what to do at once”. An 
example of an item demonstrating low efficacy is: “I tend 
to postpone important decisions to the last moment, and 
even then I have problems making them”. The overall mean 
score of all items was calculated (Cronbach α = .79, M = 
3.36). A higher score on the scale implies higher EFNC.
In this study cognitive ability was assessed by 
processing speed measure as the WAIS-R Digit-Symbol 
Substitution Subtest (Wechsler, 1997). Performance was 
assessed by the total number of items correctly answered 
within the allotted time period. We used this measurement 
as instead RSPAN used in Study 1, because it seems to fare 
quite well to account for adult age differences in measures 
of cognitive functioning and because the proportion of age-
related variance in cognitive performance that is related to 
working memory capacity is also shared to a large extent 
with processing-speed measures (Salthouse & Meinz, 
1995). 
Participants were asked to complete the questionnaire 
during an individual session they attended voluntarily. 
They randomly received one of two possible packets of 
questionnaires (the order of the scales was counterbalanced). 
Later, they were debriefed. 
Results & Discussion
The results revealed that older adults presented higher 
NFC than younger adults: F(1,102) = 20.28; p < .001; η2 = .14, 
and they were able to copy fewer symbols in a given time: 
F(1,102) = 215.91; p < .001; η2 = .68. 
To examine the study hypothesis we performed a two 
way within between ANOVA with the two age groups as a 
between factor and the cognitive – motivational varibales 
(NFC versus EFNC) a within factor. The ANOVA yielded a 
significant interaction (F(1,225) = 32.71, p < .01, η2=.20). 
Table 4 shows the cells mean. 
The Bonferroni a posteriori test shows that the younger 
group’s NFC is significantly lower than that of the older, 
but the later group’s EFNC is significantly higher than that 
of the former. Thus, the study hypothesis is confirmed. 
The results obtained in Study 2 offer an initial support 
for the hypothesis that the inconsistency found in the older 
group between their NFC and their information processing 
may be explained by their lower level of EFNC. Moreover, 
the fact that the older group is also characterized by higher 
NFC than that of the younger one, is also consistent 
with the conclusion of Study 1 because Bar-Tal’s and 
colleagues model postulate that the lower the individual’s 
EFNC relative to his/her NFC, the higher the chances of 
use of information processing that is inconsistent with the 
individual’s epistemic need. 
General Discussion
In the study we found age differences in the way that need 
for closure influences cognitive structuring. Specifically, 
we found that under high need for closure older adults 
recognized less relevant information than irrelevant items, 
which is not the case among young participants. For older 
adults, the results were opposite to that predicted by their 
motivation: higher NFC was associated with less schema-
irrelevant information recognized. This effect could be 
interpreted as demonstrating that older adults have too 
low EFNC to fulfill their higher NFC. Consistent with this 
interpretation, the results of Study 2 showing that older 
adults are characterized by higher NFC, but at the same 
time by lower EFNC than their younger counterparts. 
In general, the results of the study demonstrate that 
for low EFNC individuals (which is probably the case in 
older adults), higher NFC is associated with more effortful 
processing and more extensive collection of information. 
Thus, among older adults need for closure is not related 
to the conservation of scarce cognitive resources but to a 
greater use of ineffective and effortful processing. This 
behavior is not adaptive for older adults, even if they use 
a more effortful and systematic manner of information 
processing, which is usually considered rational and 
functional. The adaptive epistemic behavior should be 
consistent with their motivational orientation. 
A better understanding of the cognitive-motivational 
factors associated with age-related changes in cognitive 
structuring may help to form a more optimistic view of 
Younger group Old group
NFC 3.36 ±0.64 3.78 ±0.66
EFNC 3.65±0.67 2.99 ±0.84
Table 4
The level of NFC and EFNC as a function of age group.
NFC – need for closure; EFNC – efficacy at fulfilling need for closure 
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the effect of aging on cognition. Rather than emphasizing 
deterministic factors such as loss of resources and objective 
deterioration of abilities as an explanatory framework, the 
present approach suggests that a combination of the effect 
of epistemic needs and the efficacy to fulfill it (rather than 
the objective ability) may explain the effect of age on 
cognitive structuring. Indeed, although we found a very 
strong effect of age on cognitive capabilities, the later did 
not affect the cognitive structuring behavior. 
More importantly, the present approach is optimistic 
because both factors (i.e. epistemic motivation and the 
efficacy to fulfill it) may be determined by situational 
forces and prone to trainings instead of being stable, 
trait-like characteristics. Studies performed within 
the lay epistemic theory demonstrated very often that 
epistemic motivation can be manipulated (Ford & 
Kruglanski, 1995; Kruglanski & Freund, 1983; Kruglanski 
& Webster, 1996; Mayseles & Kruglanski, 1987; Webster, 
Richter, & Kruglanski, 1996). It seems that efficacy at 
fulfilling need for closure can be situationally affected too. 
In our previous study (Bar-Tal & Kossowska, submitted) 
we demonstrated that positive mood may increase efficacy. 
Also, Otten and Bar-Tal (2002) demonstrated that the 
efficacy to fulfill the need for closure may be manipulated 
by exposing the participants to a success or failure task 
requiring cognitive structuring. Thus, the variety of 
phenomena related to cognitive structuring, which have thus 
far been explained by objective and unchangeable factors 
such as loss of memory in older age (Chen, 2004; Chen 
& Blanchard-Fields, 2000; Hess & Slaughter, 1991; Hess 
& Tate, 1991; Hess, Donley, & Vandermaas, 1989), could 
be explained by less deterministic and more manageable 
factors. 
To conclude, the present paper has demonstrated that 
there is an interaction between age and epistemic motivation 
on cognitive structuring behavior. We have suggested that 
this interaction can be explained by the effect of age on the 
efficacy to fulfill epistemic need. It has to be remembered, 
however, that although the results are consistent with this 
explanation, future research should demonstrate more 
directly the hypothesized link between age and the efficacy 
to fulfill the need for closure. 
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